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Abstract 
Emotions fulfil many social functions, but data on their essential function of establishing 
cooperation are lacking. We investigated how communicating anger and disappointment 
guides reciprocal cooperative behavior. Although anger may force cooperation by 
announcing retaliation, we predicted that communicating disappointment was less likely to 
backfire. A laboratory study in which participants played against the reciprocal strategy of tit-
for-tat showed that communicated disappointment established more cooperation than did 
anger. This effect also carried over to future cooperation decisions. Partners communicating 
disappointment evoked less anger, were evaluated more positively and as forgiving rather 
than retaliatory. Communication of disappointment thus appears conducive to establishing 
mutually beneficial relationships. 
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How Emotion Communication Guides Reciprocity: 
Establishing Cooperation Through Disappointment and Anger 
Developmental, cultural, evolutionary and social psychologists alike have started to 
recognize that obtaining an adequate understanding of emotions requires taking into account 
the social environment in which emotions are elicited (Campos, Campos, & Barrett, 1989; 
Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Morris & Keltner, 2000; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). 
Accordingly, scholars have shifted their focus to the important social functions that emotions 
fulfill by coordinating interpersonal relations (Frijda & Mesquita 1994; Keltner & Haidt, 
1999; Oatley & Jenkins, 1992). In this view, emotions communicate specific intentions to 
interaction partners, which may help in overcoming interpersonal challenges—perhaps most 
notably the problem of cooperation (Bowles & Gintis, 2002; Keltner, Haidt, & Shiota, 2006). 
 Cooperation is a decisive organizing principle of society, be it in hunter-gatherer 
tribes or complex nation-states (Nowak, 2006). Yet establishing and maintaining cooperation 
is problematic, because unconditional cooperators who invest costly time, effort or resources 
in others are vulnerable to exploitation by defectors. Reciprocity, or returning helpful and 
harmful actions in kind, represents a behavioral adaptation to this problem because it 
promotes cooperation by having cooperators retaliate against defectors (Parks & Rumble, 
2001; Sheldon, 1999; Trivers, 1971). But because misunderstandings, ambiguous situations 
and unknown intentions greatly increase the complexity of reciprocity dynamics, scholars 
have proposed that emotions function as an indispensable and ubiquitous lubricant to 
establish and maintain cooperation (McElreath et al. 2003; Van Lange, Ouwerkerk, & 
Tazelaar, 2002).  
Surprisingly, however, which discrete communicated emotions actually induce 
cooperation has (to our knowledge) never been tested empirically in the game-theoretical 
derivatives of reciprocal situations (i.e., prisoner’s dilemma and give-some dilemma or—
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more broadly—social dilemmas, see Weber, Kopelman, & Messick, 2004). Nevertheless, 
some scholars propose that anger may have evolved to address defection in an interaction 
partner (Fessler & Haley, 2003; Keltner, et al., 2006). Physiologically and cognitively, anger 
facilitates retaliatory action (Cannon, 1929; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006), making defectors more 
likely to cooperate because their costs of future defection are increased. But negotiation 
research suggests that communicating anger sometimes also has the opposite effect (Van 
Dijk, Van Kleef, Steinel, & Van Beest, 2008; Van Kleef & Côté, 2007). Through emotional 
contagion it may elicit anger in the target person (Hatfield, Rapson & Cacioppo, 1994), who 
may become more likely to retaliate instead. Anger may therefore also engender rapid 
escalation (Canary, Spitzberg, & Semic, 2007). Thus, communicated anger may force 
cooperation by announcing retaliation, but it can also backfire, yielding mutual defection and 
an interpersonal crisis.  
Although the theoretical debate of inducing cooperation in others has mainly focused 
on the antagonistic emotion of anger, we believe there is another largely overlooked emotion 
that seems relevant to this purpose: disappointment (Frijda, 1986; Van Dijk & Van 
Harreveld, 2008). Disappointment is experienced in response to unfulfilled positive 
expectations (Van Dijk, Zeelenberg, & Van der Pligt, 1999). Expressing disappointment to 
the person that caused this emotion therefore communicates that one had higher expectations 
of this person. It is this message rather than its action tendency that makes disappointment 
effective in inducing cooperation, because disappointment is associated with a tendency to do 
nothing (Van Dijk & Van Harreveld, 2008). Still, expressing disappointment in someone is a 
powerful statement that can even elicit concessions from negotiation partners (Timmers, 
Fischer, & Manstead, 1998; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2006; Van Kleef & Van 
Lange, 2008). And exactly because it addresses defection without communicating a prospect 
of retaliation, as anger does, it is less likely to backfire. Our central hypothesis therefore is 
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that reciprocal actions more successfully establish cooperation when one responds to 
defection with disappointment instead of anger. 
The Present Study 
We will test our hypothesis by letting participants play a give-some dilemma (see 
below) against a Tit-For-Tat (TFT) strategy. This strictly reciprocal strategy has become 
famous for establishing cooperation by always cooperating at its first move and subsequently 
mirroring its partner’s actions (Axelrod, 1984). By doing so, it is retaliatory because it 
responds to defection with defection but also forgiving because it resumes cooperation after 
defection when its partner does so too. Because anger and disappointment may elicit 
perceptions of retaliation and forgiveness too, these emotions could strongly influence the 
effectiveness of TFT. Finally, we will examine if any effects of these emotions will carry 
over to future interactions with the same partner in another context. 
Method 
 Participants and experimental design. Ninety-seven undergraduate students (22% 
male, average age = 20.08) participated in exchange for 3.50 (approximately $5) or course 
credits. Participants were randomly assigned to the disappointment, anger or no-emotion 
condition. 
 Procedure. Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were seated in separate 
cubicles in front of a computer. For our experiment we adjusted the paradigm used by Van 
Lange et al. (2002). Participants read that in every trial they and their partner, who was 
actually computer-simulated, would start with 10 coins and that they both had to decide 
simultaneously how many coins they wanted to donate to the other. Each coin kept to oneself 
was worth 0.50; coins donated to one’s partner were worth 1.00. This situation represents a 
give-some dilemma because keeping one’s coins yields higher individual outcomes than 
donating one’s coins, yet if both players follow this strategy, each individual obtains lower 
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outcomes than if they both donate all their coins. Participants who obtained more money with 
the game had higher chances to win one of several 10 prizes. Subsequently, every 
participant played for 14 trials against a TFT-strategy that donated 10 coins in the first trial 
and subsequently imitated the participant’s donations.  
Emotion manipulation. Participants read that either they or their partner, if desired, 
could send the other player emotion messages every three rounds. Participants therefore first 
practiced in composing messages by selecting an emotion label and indicating to what extent 
they experienced this emotion on a scale of 0 (not at all) to 10 (very much). To warrant the 
credibility of the emotion communication we emphasized that it was perfectly fine to 
communicate a specific emotion several times or with minimal intensity. Subsequently, their 
partner was seemingly at random appointed to send messages. After the second, fifth, eighth 
and eleventh trial participants in the anger and disappointment conditions would then receive 
a message reading that their partner felt angry/disappointed about the number of coins they 
had donated. It was clearly stated that the first emotion message pertained to the first two 
rounds and the subsequent emotion messages to every three preceding rounds. Participants in 
the no-emotion condition received no messages. To make the emotion information more 
realistic we covaried its communicated intensity with the number of donated coins. If 
participants had donated ten coins in the previous three trials the intensity was 0 out of 10—
indicating that their partner did not at all feel angry or disappointed—and if participants had 
donated fewer coins the intensity increased to ultimately 10 out of 10 when no coins were 
donated.  
 Dependent measures. Our main dependent behavioral measure was the number of 
coins participants donated to their partner in each trial. To explore if the communicated 
emotions would also spill over to cooperation decisions in a different context, we gave 
participants the opportunity to affect their partner’s (and thereby also their own) chances in 
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the lottery. They could anonymously decide to let their partner’s number of tickets increase 
or decrease with 0 to 10%. Afterwards, we also asked a series of questions on a 7-point scale 
(1 = totally disagree, 7 = totally agree). Seven items were used to measure participants’ 
impression of their partner (Van Kleef, et al. 2006; e.g., “my partner made a cooperative 
impression”, “during the game, my partner made a hostile impression”). Retaliation 
perceptions were measured with the items “My partner will react fiercely when something is 
done to him or her”, “My partner will not retaliate if damage is caused to him or her” 
(reversed), and “My partner will take action if he or she is disadvantaged” ( = .68). 
Perceived forgiveness was measured with the items “my partner is forgiving” and “my 
partner will not easily let a conflict get out of hand”; r = .39, p < .001. Participants were also 
asked how angry they felt. Furthermore, we asked in both emotion conditions if participants 
found it justified that their partner felt as he or she had communicated, and if participants 
could imagine their partner’s feelings (r = .95, p < .001). The emotion manipulation was 
checked by asking participants how often their partner communicated fear, shame, happiness, 
envy, pride, sadness and, importantly, anger and disappointment (1 = not at all, 7 = very 
often). Finally, participants were debriefed, paid and thanked. 
Results.  
Manipulation check. Separate one-way ANOVAs on the anger (F[2, 94] = 54.64) and 
disappointment (F[2, 94] = 52.86) manipulation checks yielded strong effects of emotion 
(both ps < .001; both ²s > .52). Communicated anger was reported most often in the anger 
condition (Manger = 5.10, SD = 2.61 vs. Mdisappointment = 1.06, SD = 0.36 and Mno emotion = 1.60, 
SD = 1.22; both ts > 8.54, both ps < .001) and communicated disappointment was reported 
most often in the disappointment condition (Mdisappointment = 5.26, SD = 2.38 vs. Manger = 1.13, 
SD = 0.72 and Mno emotion = 1.89, SD = 1.57; both ts > 8.09, both ps < .001).  
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Cooperation. We pooled the post-manipulation trials in four blocks by calculating the 
average contributions in the three trials following each emotion communication and 
conducted a 3 (emotion) × 4 (blocks) mixed-model ANOVA. In this and subsequent analyses 
we controlled for any pre-manipulation differences in cooperation by including the average 
contribution in the first two trials as a covariate. Results revealed an overall interaction, F(2, 
93) = 3.01, p = .05, ²p = .06 (see Figure 1). Post-hoc comparisons showed that cooperation 
increased faster when disappointment as opposed to anger (F[1, 59] = 3.90, p = .05, ²p = .06) 
or no emotion (F[1, 63] = 5.08, p = .03, ²p = .07) was communicated. Moreover, linear trend 
analysis revealed that communicating disappointment gradually increased cooperation (F[1, 
29] = 5.61, p = .02, ²p = .16) whereas anger and no emotion did not (both Fs < 1, both ps > 
.43). Finally, a one-way ANOVA on the last block of trials showed a main effect of emotion, 
F(2, 93) = 3.95, p = .02, ² = .06. Disappointment established more cooperation than anger (p 
= .007) with no emotion inducing intermediate cooperation in comparison to anger and 
disappointment (both ps > .12). 
To examine any spill-over effects in the give-some dilemma we conducted a one-way 
ANOVA on the percentage with which participants decided to increase or decrease the 
other’s lottery tickets. Results showed a main effect of emotion, F(2, 93) = 3.35, p = .04, ² = 
.06. Post-hoc tests revealed that people allocated a more positive outcome to their partner 
when disappointment (M = +6.24%) was communicated as opposed to anger (M = +2.34%, p 
= .01) or no emotion (M = +3.37%, p = .06). 
Emotion inferences. To test whether anger and disappointment affected retaliation and 
forgiveness perceptions, we conducted 3 (emotion) × 2 (perception: forgiving vs. retaliatory) 
mixed-model ANOVA. This yielded a significant interaction, F(2, 93) = 5.35, p = .006, ²p = 
.10 (see Table 1 for all means and standard errors). Simple-effect analyses showed that 
disappointed partners were perceived as more forgiving than retaliatory (p = .006), whereas 
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for angry partners the opposite trend occurred, indicating they were perceived as relatively 
retaliatory (p = .15). Moreover, planned comparisons showed that angry partners were 
perceived as more retaliatory than partners in the disappointed (p = .05) and no-emotion 
conditions (p = .06) and as less forgiving (both ps < .02). 
Separate one-way ANOVAs showed main effects of emotion on reported anger (F[1, 
93] = 7.64, p < .001, ² = .14) and impression of the opponent (F[1, 93] = 12.47, p < .001, ² 
= .19). Post-hoc analyses revealed that partners communicating disappointment (M = 6.11) or 
no emotion (M = 5.84) received a more favorable impression than partners communicating 
anger (M = 4.98; both ps < .001). Furthermore, angry partners induced more anger in 
participants (M = 1.84) than partners communicating disappointment (M = 1.02) or no 
emotion (M = 1.10; both ps < .001). Finally, participants evaluated communicating anger or 
disappointment as equally justified (Mdisappointment = 4.89, Manger = 4.54, F < 1, p = .42) and 
one sample t-tests showed that these ratings differed significantly from the midpoint of the 
scale (t[61] = 3.06, p = .003). These findings further indicate that the manipulation was 
credible and that differences in perceived appropriateness between both emotions cannot 
explain our findings. 
Discussion 
 The present study investigated if the communication of discrete emotions is conducive 
to establishing cooperation when an interaction partner refrains from returning a favor. The 
results show that communicating disappointment in the other more successfully induces 
cooperation than does communicating anger or not communicating any emotion. 
Disappointed partners were perceived as forgiving rather than retaliatory, whereas the 
opposite was true for angry partners. Anger thus risks escalation, whereas disappointment 
emphasizes the possibility of obtaining better outcomes. Moreover, this behavioral effect 
carries over to future social decision-making with the same interaction partner. 
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 Our point is not that communicating an intention to retaliate is necessarily 
detrimental. After all, reciprocation implies retaliation and TFT would be unsuccessful 
without it. But our results do show that addressing defection by communicating anger clearly 
overemphasizes retaliation. Not only did it evoke anger, participants also had a less positive 
impression of their partner. Expressing disappointment, however, is an attempt to address 
defection without incurring such costs. And in that it appears quite successful—at least when, 
like in the present study, its communication is experienced as appropriate. Moreover, because 
communicating disappointment does not lead to negative impressions, expressing anger still 
remains a viable option when disappointment fails to induce cooperation.  
 Even though we believe the importance and benefits of disappointment have not yet 
been fully appreciated in the emotion and cooperation literature, we do not want to suggest 
that it always induces more cooperation than anger does. For example, because anger more 
strongly emphasizes retaliation than disappointment does, it may be quite effective in 
averting defection when one’s partner fears retaliation. In our experiment communicating 
anger may have resulted in escalation because both players had equal retaliatory power, but 
when in asymmetric give-some dilemmas the more powerful person communicates anger this 
may actually promote cooperation (cf. Van Kleef & Côté, 2007). Taken together, these 
results show that how people establish and maintain cooperation can only be fully understood 
by recognizing that communicated emotions are inherent to the dynamics of reciprocity. 
 To conclude, the next time someone fails to return a favor, it seems wise to 
reciprocate this action while communicating disappointment instead of anger. This 
emphasizes potential forgiveness rather than retaliation, thereby maintaining a good 
relationship with the other instead of evoking anger. But above all, communicating 
disappointment is more likely to establish a mutually beneficial relationship. 
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Figure 1.  
Number of donated coins as a function of emotion and block. Error bars depict standard 
error per condition. 
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Table 1 
Retaliation and Forgiveness Perceptions by Emotion. 
 Dependent variables 
Emotion  Retaliation Forgiveness 
Anger 4.73a  (0.18) 4.22a (0.24) 
Disappointment 4.21b  (0.19) 5.21c (0.24) 
No emotion 4.25ab (0.17) 4.98c (0.23) 
Note. Entries are means on 7-point scales, with higher values indicating higher retaliation or 
forgiveness perceptions. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Means in the same row or 
column with a different subscript differ at p  .05. 
 
 
